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THE ETHICS OF BIG DATA IN GENOMICS: 
THE INSTRUCTIVE ICELANDIC SAGA OF THE 
INCIDENTALOME 
DONNA M. GITTER* 
“Medical science has made such tremendous 
progress that there is hardly a healthy human left.” 
-- Aldous Huxley, 1894-1963 
ABSTRACT 
DeCODE Genetics, Inc., a pioneering Icelandic biotech firm, recently 
introduced a free website that permits Icelanders to learn whether they 
carry mutations in the BRCA2 gene that are known to increase cancer 
risk, even if these citizens have never participated in genetic testing. 
Approximately five thousand Icelanders have elected thus far to receive 
their status. This site is made possible by the consanguinity of Icelandic 
citizens, who number fewer than 350,000, and their detailed genealogical 
records dating back centuries, a set of circumstances that presents a 
unique opportunity to study genetic mutations and the medical disorders 
associated with them. Using such information, deCODE has the ability to 
impute genetic information about individuals without any legal 
requirement to obtain their informed consent. 
This ability to impute individuals’ genotypes without having gathered 
bio-specimens or medical information directly from them calls into 
question researchers’ duty to inform individuals about their health risks, 
and the individuals’ right not to know (“RNTK”), defined as the idea that 
people ought to be able to control their receipt of genetic information 
about themselves. The emergence of unanticipated and yet highly 
significant genetic findings is referred to as the “incidentalome.” 
Commentators use the phrase “incidental findings” (“IFs”) to refer to 
medically important information that arises from research but is unrelated 
 
 
*  Professor of Law, Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business, City University of New York.  
BA, Cornell University, JD; University of Pennsylvania Law School. Fulbright-SyCip Distinguished 
Lecturer Award in the Philippines for the 2016-2017 academic year. The author appreciates the 
thoughtful comments of her discussant Professor Andrew Torrance and the hosts of and other 
participants in the Wiet Life Science Law Scholars Conference at Loyola University Chicago School 
of Law on September 7, 2018. She also wishes to thank the hosts of and participants in the Normative 
Business Ethics Workshop held on November 2, 2018 at the Zicklin Center for Business Ethics 
Research at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. 
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to the goals of that research.   
This article analyzes the return by researchers of genetic IFs to 
individuals whose genotypic data has been imputed, and who therefore 
have not indicated their consent to receive such information. While 
Iceland is at the forefront of this issue due to its small, homogeneous 
population, other nations increasingly encounter the same need to balance 
individual autonomy with responsibility for public health. 
Part II of this Article will consider the global rise of biobanks and the 
concomitant challenges posed to the right not to know. Part III considers 
how the incidentalome arises in Iceland, a country renowned for its 
genomic research, while Part IV examines the current debate in Iceland 
regarding the release of imputed genomic information to its citizens. 
International laws and norms regarding the RNTK are the subject of Part 
V.  Part VI of this Article explores the legal and ethical arguments 
surrounding the three possible approaches considered in Iceland for the 
release of imputed BRCA2 genetic data: no return of the data; make it 
publicly known that the information is available and thus enable 
individuals to take the initiative to request that information for themselves; 
or contact the affected individuals directly to inform them that researchers 
possess information relevant to their health. Because similar legal and 
ethical questions arise when health care providers consider their duty to 
inform individuals exposed to HIV and AIDS, Part VII analyzes 
considerations surrounding the provision of this risk information. Finally, 
Part VIII of this Article proposes an approach for the future, emphasizing 
the need for a robust public service campaign that encourages individuals 
to access their imputed genetic data and, more broadly, for expanded 
governmental investment in and public access to genetic testing.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/6
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I. INTRODUCTION 
DeCODE Genetics, Inc., a pioneering Icelandic biotech firm, recently 
introduced a free website that permits Icelanders to learn whether they 
carry mutations in the BRCA2 gene that are known to increase cancer risk, 
even if these citizens have never participated in genetic testing. 
Approximately 5,000 citizens have elected thus far to receive their status.1 
This is made possible by the consanguinity of Icelandic citizens, who 
number fewer than 350,000,2 and their detailed genealogical records 
dating back centuries, a set of circumstances that presents a unique 
opportunity to study genetic mutations and the medical disorders 
associated with them.3 Dr. Kári Stefánsson, the founder and CEO of 
deCODE, has been able, by combining the genomic data deCODE has 
gathered and using genealogical records, to impute the genotypes of not 
only the Icelanders who have participated in its genetic research, but even 
those who have not, including individuals who are deceased.4 Stefánsson 
asserts the ability to “impute [genetic] variants with a frequency down to 
.05%, so basically everything except extremely rare familial or de novo 
mutations.”5 
This ability to impute individuals’ genotypes without having gathered 
bio-specimens or medical information directly from them calls into 
question researchers’ duty to inform individuals about their health risks, 
and the individuals’ right not to know (“RNTK”), defined as the idea that 
people ought to be able to control their receipt of genetic information 
about themselves.6 Noting that the affected women have an 82% 
probability of developing a fatal cancer and have a life expectancy twelve 
years shorter than other women, Stefánsson requested from the Icelandic 
 
 
1  Justin Petrone, DeCode Begins BRCA2 Mutation Service in Iceland as Society Debates 
‘Right to Not Know,’ GENOMEWEB (July 9, 2018) hereinafter Petrone, DeCode Begins BRCA2 
Mutation Service], https://www.genomeweb.com/cancer/decode-begins-brca2-mutation-service-
iceland-society-debates-right-not-know#.W0dRKi2ZNm8. 
2  Jelena Ćirić, Icelandic Population Continues Upward Trend, ICE. REV. (Jan. 29, 2018), 
http://icelandreview.com/news/2018/01/29/icelandic-population-continues-upward-trend. 
3  See Donna M. Gitter, Informed Consent and Privacy of Non-Identified Bio-Specimens and 
Estimated Data: Lessons from Iceland and the United States in an Era of Computational Genomics, 38 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1255-56 (2017) (describing the unique aspects of the Icelandic population 
that render the country an optimal setting for genomic research). 
4  Justin Petrone, In Iceland, Debate Simmer Over Imputed Genotypes, Preventive Medicine, 
and Public Health, GENOMEWEB (Jan. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Petrone, In Iceland, Debate Simmers], 
https://www.genomeweb.com/molecular-diagnostics/iceland-debate-simmers-over-imputed-
genotypes-preventive-medicine-and-public. 
5  Id. 
6  Benjamin E. Berkman, Refuting the Right Not to Know, 19 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 6 
(2016). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/6
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government permission to inform these women.7 The Icelandic Parliament 
responded by charging the Ministry of Health with developing guidelines 
for informing Icelandic citizens of their potential genetic vulnerability.8 
Stefánsson participated as a committee member, but resigned before the 
group reached its conclusion. Ultimately, the Ministry of Health 
committee issued an opinion declining to permit deCODE to contact 
affected Icelanders, and that same day deCODE established its website.9    
This emergence of unanticipated and yet highly significant genetic 
findings is referred to as the “incidentalome.”10 Similarly, commentators 
use the phrase “incidental findings” (which will be employed and 
shortened to “IFs” throughout this article) to refer to medically significant 
information that arises from research but is unrelated to the goals of that 
research.11  
This Article will analyze the return of IFs to individuals whose 
genotypic data has been imputed, and who therefore have not explicitly 
indicated their consent to receive such information. While Iceland is at the 
forefront of this issue first due to its small, homogeneous population and 
detailed genealogical records, other nations increasingly encounter the 
same debate. As noted by Myles Axton, Chief Editor of the journal Nature 
Genetics, a large enough U.S. database could also be used to make similar 
inferences.12 This fact, combined with the trend toward global networking 
 
 
7  Petrone, In Iceland, Debate Simmers, supra note 4. Male carriers of this mutation have a 72% 
lifetime risk of serious cancer, a 36% risk of prostate cancer, and a life expectancy roughly seven years 
shorter than that of non-carriers. Petrone, DeCode Begins BRCA2 Mutation Service, supra note 1. 
8  Petrone, In Iceland, Debate Simmers, supra note 4. 
9  Petrone, DeCode Begins BRCA2 Mutation Service, supra note 1. 
10  Kadri Simm, Biobanks and Feedback, in THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE RIGHT NOT TO 
KNOW 55, 55 (Ruth Chadwick et al. eds., 2014). 
11  See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, ANTICIPATE AND 
COMMUNICATE: ETHICAL MANAGEMENT OF INCIDENTAL AND SECONDARY FINDINGS IN THE 
CLINICAL, RESEARCH, AND DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER CONTEXTS 22, 27–28 (2013) [hereinafter 
ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE]. It should be noted that IFs can be distinguished from individual 
research results (“IRRs”) generated from genetic research. While both IFs and IRRs are research 
findings concerning an individual contributor that are potentially significant in medical and/or 
reproductive terms, IFs are beyond the specific aims of the study, whereas IRRs are findings pertaining 
to the specific aims of the study. Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and Research 
Results in Genomic Research Involving Biobanks and Archived Data Sets, 14 GENETICS IN MED. 361, 
364 (2012). However, in the context of this article, which discusses the return of these findings, IFs 
and IRRs are comparable from the perspective of the data contributor and will be referred to 
collectively as IFs. 
12  Antonio Regalado, Genome Study Predicts DNA of the Whole of Iceland, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/536096/genome-study-predicts-dna-of-the-
whole-of-iceland. While the United States lacks a national database similar to Iceland's, private 
companies such as 23andMe and Ancestry.com have created rough gene maps of several million 
people, and the NIH has formulated a plan to spend millions of dollars in the coming years sequencing 
full genome data on tens of thousands of people. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of biobanks,13 demonstrates that the RNTK imputed genetic data impacts 
communities around the world and therefore is of international 
significance. 
Part II of this Article will consider the global rise of biobanks and the 
concomitant challenges posed to the management of the incidentalome and 
the RNTK. Part III considers how the incidentalome arises in Iceland, a 
country renowned for its genomic research, while Part IV examines the 
current debate in Iceland regarding the release of imputed genomic 
information to its citizens. International laws and norms regarding the 
RNTK are the subject of Part V. Part VI of this Article explores the legal 
and ethical arguments surrounding the three possible approaches 
considered in Iceland for the release of imputed BRCA2 genetic data: no 
return of the data; make it publicly known that the information is available 
and thus enable individuals to take the initiative to request that information 
for themselves; or contact the affected individuals directly to inform them 
that researchers possess information relevant to their health. Because 
similar legal and ethical questions arise when health care providers 
consider their duty to inform individuals exposed to HIV and AIDS, Part 
VII analyzes considerations surrounding the provision of this risk 
information. Finally, Part VIII of this Article proposes an approach for the 
future, emphasizing the need for a robust public service campaign that 
encourages individuals to access their imputed genetic data and, more 
broadly, for expanded governmental investment in and public access to 
genetic testing. Increasingly, direct access to such testing through a 
clinician will allow individuals to express explicitly their desire to receive 
or reject information about their genetic risk profiles, which is preferable 
to offering imputed genetic information without explicit consent.  
 
 
 
 
13 A human biobank is defined as “a biorepository that accepts, processes, stores and distributes 
bio-specimens “such as blood, organs, and tissue samples, along with “associated data for use in 
research and clinical care.” Yvonne G. De Souza & John S. Greenspan, Biobanking Past, Present and 
Future: Responsibilities and Benefits, 27 AIDS 303, 303 (2013) (describing the history and future of 
biobanking). The term “biobank” is frequently used to refer to a collection of human biological 
materials that contain at least traces of DNA or RNA that would allow for genetic analysis. Bernice S. 
Elger & Arthur L. Caplan, Consent and Anonymization in Research Involving Biobanks: Differing 
Terms and Norms Present Serious Barriers to an International Framework, 7 EMBO REP. 661, 661 
(2006) (citation omitted). While human bio-specimens and associated data have been collected for 
over 100 years, De Souza & Greenspan, supra (citation omitted), commentators assert that the term 
“biobank” did not appear in PubMed until 1996 and was not commonly used until around 2000. Elger 
& Caplan, supra (citation omitted).   
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/6
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II.  THE EXPLOSION OF GENOMIC DATA GIVES RISE TO THE 
INCIDENTALOME 
Incidental findings have proliferated because cheaper and faster 
genome sequencing technologies have expanded the amount of genetic 
information available, and the “previously unimaginable goal of a $1,000 
genome is now nearly obtainable.”14 As a result, genomic sequencing, 
already an important tool for researchers, is increasingly employed in 
clinical medicine as well.15 At the level of individual consumers, the 
direct-to-consumer genetic industry is increasingly robust, and individuals 
voluntarily generate and share personal genetic information they obtain via 
direct-to-consumer tests. For example, the website patientslikeme.com 
offers a forum for patients to communicate with others who have similar 
diagnoses, and these individuals identify themselves through their social 
media accounts.16 
Along with the explosion of genetic information, another factor that 
renders the handling of IFs particularly challenging is the structure of the 
biobanks themselves.  Biobanking, which began with small, university-
based collections developed for the research needs of a specific project, 
has changed vastly in the last four decades. The taxonomy of biobanks 
now includes institutional and government-supported repositories; 
commercial biobanks; population-based collections; disease-specific 
biobanks; and, most recently, virtual biobanks. Population-wide biobanks 
have been established by several nations, including Canada, Denmark, 
Estonia, Iceland, Japan, Latvia, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States, in order to collect and analyze 
genotypic and phenotypic information of their populations.17 Global 
research networks have arisen through the establishment of virtual 
biobanks, which are electronic databases of biological specimens and other 
related information, designed to allow researchers worldwide to locate bio-
specimens for testing and data mining from biobanks in dispersed 
locations.18 Pooling of such data is considered vital in order to develop 
means of diagnosing and treating common medical disorders.19 In addition 
to the increased complexity of the structure of biobanks, the data 
associated with stored bio-specimens is more detailed, including not only 
 
 
14  Berkman, supra note 6, at 3. 
15  Id. 
16  Simm, supra note 10, at 57. 
17  De Souza & Greenspan, supra note 13, at 303. 
18  De Souza & Greenspan, supra note 13, at 304. 
19  Simm, supra note 10, at 57. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
358 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 18:351 
 
 
 
fundamental information such as dates of collection and diagnoses, but 
also demographic characteristics, information about the contributors’20 
phenotypes, and the like.21   
While biobanks are quite diverse in terms of the specimens and data 
they collect, they share certain characteristics that complicate the issue of 
whether to share IFs with individual contributors, a process referred to in 
Europe as “feedback.”22 Biobanks typically involve research settings 
where investigators are working mostly with anonymized23 samples, and 
most contributors have signed consent forms stating that they will not be 
contacted.24 This complicates the question of whether IFs should be 
returned to bio-specimen contributors, in the absence of their explicit 
consent to receive these results. This issue is further complicated in 
Iceland by the fact that genetic information can be imputed for individuals 
who did not even directly participate in genetic research.25 Thus, genetic 
research in Iceland raises not just the typical issues relating to IFs but 
involves additional complexity in that the return of IFs must be considered 
when the contributor did not wittingly participate in research. This issue 
comes into sharper focus with an understanding of the history of genetic 
research in Iceland.    
III. THE HISTORY OF GENETIC RESEARCH IN ICELAND 
Genetic research in Iceland began over two decades ago with the direct 
gathering of biomedical samples and associated data from individual 
citizens. Over time, genetic research there has grown more reliant on 
imputed data.26 This allows access to a larger sample size, obviates the 
need for informed consent, and generally gives rise to fewer transaction 
 
 
20  The term “contributor” is used in this article to refer to refer to individuals whose data and 
samples are collected in biobanks, whether or not they also qualify as human subjects entitled to 
informed consent. Cf. Wolf et al., supra note 11, at 364.   
21  De Souza & Greenspan, supra note 13, at 303. 
22  See generally Simm, supra note 10.  
23  While the terminology concerning the identifiability of biological samples is quite complex, 
see generally Elger & Caplan, supra note 13, the term “anonymized” as it is used here refers to 
samples for which a code links the sample to its donor. U.S. regulations deem such samples non-
identifiable, as long as an agreement prohibits the release to the investigators of the key to the code, 
and therefore not requiring informed consent for their use. Id. at 664 (noting how U.S. regulations, in 
contrast to those in Europe, do not require informed consent for coded samples).  
24  Simm, supra note 10, at 57. For example, the U.K. Biobank consent form states that the 
undersigned agrees that: “I understand that none of my results will be given to me (except for some 
measurements during this visit) and that I will not benefit financially from taking part . . . .” CONSENT 
FORM: UK BIOBANK, http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Consent_form.pdf 
(last accessed July 6, 2018). 
25  See infra notes 31-45 and accompanying text. 
26  Gitter, supra note 3, at 1256-59. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/6
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costs for researchers. When Icelandic neurologist Dr. Kári Stefánsson 
founded the biotechnology enterprise deCODE Genetics, Inc. in 1996, the 
company planned to benefit from Iceland's genetic homogeneity and the 
availability of detailed genealogical information in order to pioneer 
genetic population studies with information gathered from the Icelandic 
population.27 Indeed, in 1999, the Icelandic government granted to 
deCODE an exclusive twelve-year license to build a Health Sector 
Database to hold centralized health records of its entire population.28   
Within a short time, deCODE encountered opposition to its plan to 
build a database because the company’s arrangement with the Icelandic 
government rested on the presumption that the citizens of Iceland had 
consented to include their information unless they explicitly opted out.29 In 
2003, Ragnhildur Guõmundsdóttir, an eighteen-year-old Icelandic student, 
brought a legal challenge against the presumption that citizens opted in to 
deCODE’s database, arguing against the inclusion of the health records of 
her deceased father, who did not state any preference during his life. The 
Icelandic Supreme Court held in the plaintiff’s favor, on the grounds that 
the records in the database might allow her to be identified as an 
individual at risk of a heritable disease, even though the data would be 
anonymous and encrypted. The court noted that this risk was heightened 
by the fact that the Health Sector Database would allow information to be 
linked with data from other genetic and genealogical databases.30 
After the Icelandic Supreme Court barred a database model presuming 
that all Icelanders had opted in, deCODE then pursued another strategy, 
using estimated data to create a research database to find genetic 
sequences linked to diseases.31 Using DNA and clinical data from more 
than 120,000 research volunteers, over one-third of the population, 
deCODE analyzed their DNA sequences for slight, common genetic 
variations.32 DeCODE geneticists then calculated the probability that an 
individual carries a particular genetic variant without actually sequencing 
 
 
27  See Science, DECODE GENETICS (July 7, 2018), https://www.decode.com/research/. 
28  Alison Abbott, Icelandic Database Shelved as Court Judges Privacy in Peril, 429 NATURE 
118, 118 (2004). 
29  David E. Winickoff, Genome and Nation: Iceland's Health Sector Database and its Legacy, 
1 INNOVATIONS 80, 82-83 (2006).  
30  Abbott, supra note 28, at 188. For an English translation of the decision, see Icelandic 
Supreme Court, No. 151/2003: Ragnhildur Guõmundsdóttir v. The State of Iceland, Elec. Privacy Info. 
Ctr. (Nov. 27, 2003), https://epic.org/privacy/genetic/iceland_decision.pdf. 
31  Jocelyn Kaiser, Agency Nixes deCODE's New Data-Mining Plan, 340 SCIENCE 1388, 1388-
89 (2013) [hereinafter Kaiser, Agency Nixes deCODE].  
32  Id. at 1389. DeCODE now claims that over 160,000 citizens, more than half of the adult 
population, has volunteered to participate in its genetic research. Science, supra note 27. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
360 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 18:351 
 
 
 
that person's DNA. For example, deCODE was able to use its whole 
genome sequencing of the DNA of approximately 2,500 research 
participants in order to extrapolate the genomes of many more individuals. 
When deCODE identified a genetic variant of interest among the 2,500 
whole genomes, the company used the more limited information about the 
genetic variations that it had amassed from its 120,000 volunteers in order 
to impute, with 99% accuracy, whether any among these 120,000 also 
carried the mutations.33 As noted by one source, “if your mother had been 
in the hospital for a stroke and agreed to participate in a clinical study, 
while her brother had volunteered his DNA, deCODE would be able to 
predict your likelihood of a genetic disposition for stroke.”34  
While other researchers are using the same technique as deCODE, the 
company's unique approach relies on its access to the detailed genealogical 
information available in Iceland. DeCODE is able to combine the known 
and estimated genotypes of its research participants with its genealogical 
database, thereby estimating what it calls the “in silico” genotypes of close 
relatives of the volunteers whose slight genetic variations were analyzed. 
This strategy permits deCODE to infer data of about 200,000 living and 
80,000 deceased Icelanders, none of whom have consented to participate 
in deCODE’s studies. Further, this imputation approach could essentially 
give the company genotypes for the largely consanguineous population of 
nearly 350,000 people in its entirety. Researchers can then determine 
whether a variant in the DNA sequence found by fully sequencing the 
DNA of a small group likewise appears in a larger population in the same 
proportion.35  
DeCODE not only uses these estimated genotypes as controls in its 
studies, but also correlates them with health records for patients whose 
DNA has not been sampled, but who have participated in other types of 
medical studies.36 Using estimated data, deCODE published six papers 
between 2011 and 2013 in the prestigious journals Nature, Nature 
Genetics, and the New England Journal of Medicine, linking specific 
genetic mutations to risks of diseases.37 DeCODE’s drug discovery efforts 
 
 
33  Kaiser, Agency Nixes deCODE, supra note 31, at 1389.  
34  Rebecca Goldin, Privacy and Our Genes: Is deCode's DNA Project ‘Big Brother' or the 
Gateway to a Healthier Future?, GENETIC LITERACY PROJECT (June 24, 
2013), http://www.geneticliteracyproject.org/2013/06/24/privacy-and-our-genes-is-decodes-dna-
project-big-brother-or-the-gateway-to-a-healthier-future/#.UpzQLY5n9So. 
35  Kaiser, Agency Nixes deCODE, supra note 31, at 1389. 
36  Jocelyn Kaiser, Pioneering Icelandic Genetics Company Denied Approval for Data-Mining 
Plan, SCIENCE (June 20, 2013) [hereinafter Kaiser, Pioneering Icelandic Genetics Company Denied 
Approval], http://news.sciencemag.org/people-events/2013/06/pioneering-icelandic-genetics-
company-denied-approval-data-mining-plan. 
37  Kaiser, Pioneering Genetics Company Denied Approval, supra note 36. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/6
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were less successful, however, and the company declared bankruptcy in 
2009.38 In December 2012, Amgen purchased the company for $415 
million.39   
In 2012, deCODE planned to use its strategy as part of a new study. 
Having imputed the genotypes of the close relatives of the volunteers 
whose slight genetic variations had been fully catalogued, deCODE 
intended to collaborate with Iceland's National Hospital to link these 
relatives to certain hospital records for individuals, such as surgery codes 
and prescriptions.40 On May 28, 2013, Iceland's Data Protection Agency 
(“DPA”) denied this request on the grounds that it would violate the 
relatives' privacy unless they gave their informed consent. The DPA gave 
deCODE until November 2013 to demonstrate that it had obtained 
consent.41  
DeCODE ultimately discovered a strategy for avoiding the requirement 
of informed consent, describing their plan in a November 5, 2013 letter to 
the DPA. DeCODE confirmed that it had deleted all data registers 
containing imputed genotypes for individuals from whom consent was 
lacking. However, the company also presented the DPA with a proposal, 
according to which genotype data from research participants (who had 
consented) would be linked with genealogy data in a manner that would 
generate statistical results as strong as those formerly achieved. According 
to the Iceland DPA:  
[T]his would entail that a genetic imputation for those who had not 
consented would be generated in a split . . . second in the processing 
memory of a computer. However, this imputation would then cease 
to exist and would never be accessible to anyone in any form. The 
only accessible data would be the aforementioned statistical results, 
which would not in any way be traceable to individuals.42  
The DPA confirmed in a letter dated November 26, 2013, that this 
proposal did not give rise to objections if “all the aforementioned 
prerequisites were met.”43 
 
 
38  Erika Check Hayden, Icelandic Genomics Firm Goes Bankrupt, 462 NATURE 401, 401 
(2009). 
39  Kaiser, Agency Nixes deCODE, supra note 31, at 1389. 
40  Id.  
41  Kate Yandell, Nordic Gene Study Requires Consent, THE SCIENTIST (June 24, 2013), 
https://www.the-scientist.com/the-nutshell/nordic-gene-study-requires-consent-39139. 
42  E-mail from Thordur Sveinsson, Icelandic Data Prot. Auth., to Prof. Donna M. Gitter, (Oct. 
20, 2014, 3:51 PM) (on file with author). 
43  Id. 
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More recently, deCODE published a series of papers in the journal 
Nature Genetics in May 2015 that described sequencing the genomes of 
2,636 Icelanders, the largest collection ever analyzed in a single human 
population.44 Using the imputation technique, deCODE employed the full 
genomes it has for about 10,000 Icelanders and the partial genetic 
information on 150,000 more to generate a report for genetic disease on 
every person in Iceland. It is in this way that the firm can identify every 
person in Iceland with the well-known BRCA2 mutation, which raises the 
risk of breast and ovarian cancer, even if the individual herself has not 
submitted to genetic testing.45 DeCODE's CEO Stefánsson expressed his 
feeling that “it's a crime not to approach these people.”46 The Icelandic 
Ministry of Health created a task force to consider whether to release IFs 
to affected individuals and/or their doctors at all, the process for doing so, 
and which disorders, if any, ought to be included, as well as how to secure 
properly informed consent in the future.47 Stefánsson was on the task force 
but later withdrew over disagreement on the issue, stating that he 
“resigned from this committee and told committee members that if they 
came to the conclusion that we could not approach these women to save 
their lives then we would set up such a website.”48 Indeed, in spring 2018, 
that is exactly what deCODE did, establishing a website49 to provide free 
information to Icelanders regarding whether they are affected by the 
BRCA2 mutation carried by nearly 1% of the population.50 Once an 
Icelander signs up with her personal identification number, DeCODE 
offers the results via an encrypted server and recommends genetic 
counseling to the recipients of positive results. Yet, the debate in Iceland 
regarding offering such results is not over, as Stefánsson strongly desires 
to reach more citizens with potentially life-saving information.51    
 
 
 
44 Daniel F. Gudbjartsson et al., Large-Scale Whole-Genome Sequencing of the Icelandic 
Population, 47 NATURE GENETICS 435 (2015).  
45  Carl Zimmer, In Iceland’s DNA, New Clues to Disease-Causing Genes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/science/in-icelands-dna-clues-to-what-genes-may-cause-
disease.html.   
46  Id.  
47 See e-mail from Thorunn Oddný Steinsdóttir, Legal Advisor, Icelandic Ministry of Welfare, 
to Prof. Donna M. Gitter (Sept. 4, 2017, 5:44 AM) (on file with author). 
48  Jelena Ćirić, Website Identifies Icelanders at Risk of Cancer, ICE. REV. (May 15, 2018) 
[hereinafter Ćirić, Website Identifies Icelanders], http://icelandreview.com/news/2018/05/15/website-
identifies-icelanders-risk-cancer. 
49  See Íslensk Erfðagreining, BRCA2 ARFGERĐ, https://www.arfgerd.is/#!/ (last visited July 
12, 2018). 
50  Ćirić, Website Identifies Icelanders, supra note 48. 
51  Petrone, DeCode Begins BRCA2 Mutation Service, supra note 1. 
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IV. THE ICELANDIC DEBATE REGARDING THE RETURN OF GENETIC 
INCIDENTAL FINDINGS 
Professor Vilhjálmur Árnason, Professor of Philosophy and Chair of 
the Centre for Ethics at the University of Iceland, has noted that “[w]hen 
deCODE Genetics started its population database research in Iceland in the 
late 1990s, the company emphasized that there was no interest in gaining 
information about individuals.”52 Referencing a New England Journal of 
Medicine article authored by deCODE co-founders Drs. Kári Stefánsson 
and Jeffrey Gulcher, Árnason observed that the broad informed consent 
that they requested and obtained from their research subjects was directed 
toward collecting biological material, genotyping the DNA, and then using 
the genotypic information they gathered. Via this broad consent for 
biobank research, participants gave deCODE permission to store their 
samples in a biobank and use them for medical research into the causes, 
diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of diseases with a genetic 
component.53 However, the deCODE co-founders eschewed the notion 
that they were gathering information on individuals, emphasizing that “the 
consent requested is for the use of genotypic data to generate knowledge 
about the nature of the group, rather than knowledge about the individual 
person.”54 
Professor Árnason has further explained that Gulcher and Stefánsson 
were aware from the outset that population database research might 
generate information about particular individuals so as to provide them 
with improved health care.55 In their New England Journal of Medicine 
article, Gulcher and Stefánsson allowed that “if the appropriate authorities 
granted permission, it would be relatively easy to identify and contact all 
persons in Iceland who had a particular risk for disease,” by asking 
participants if they “wish to be notified about any association between 
alleles they carry and specific diseases or predispositions to the 
development of disease.”56  
 DeCODE’s return of Icelandic population database research results to 
participants is without precedent in Iceland. Professor Árnason has 
explained that there is a clause in deCODE’s consent form whereby 
 
 
52  Vilhjálmur Árnason, Bioethics in Iceland, 25 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 421, 424 
(2016), http://uni.hi.is/vilhjarn/files/2016/08/Bioethics-in-Iceland_final.pdf. 
53  Id. (citing Jeffrey Gulcher & Kári Stefánsson, The Icelandic Healthcare Database and 
Informed Consent, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1827, 1828 (2000)).  
54  Gulcher & Stefánsson, supra note 53, at 1828. 
55  Árnason, supra note 52, at 424. 
56  Id. (citing Gulcher & Stefánsson, supra note 53, at 1829). 
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participants agree that deCODE can identify their personal information 
and, with the permission of the National Bioethics Committee, contact 
them personally for further research. Professor Árnason adds that this 
provision was not intended to allow researchers to inform individuals 
about their particular results.57 Moreover, Iceland’s 2014 Act on Scientific 
Research in the Health Sector covered the use of data for research 
purposes, but did not address reporting back health data to individuals.58  
Once deCODE was able to identify the approximately 1,200 Icelandic 
women with a greater than 80% risk of facing breast and/or ovarian cancer 
associated with the BRCA2 gene, Stefánsson urged the Icelandic Ministry 
of Health to decrypt the data and inform these woman.59 Decrying the 
Icelandic health authorities’ uncertainty as to how to proceed, Stefánsson 
emphasized: “I have told them that I find it ruthless not to at least contact 
these women and offer to keep them under close surveillance. I am 
convinced that it is possible to prevent premature death in this group of 
women.”60 Given that the mutation is lethal, and “particularly when it 
comes to the women, most of the risk can be mitigated by preventive 
surgery,” Stefánsson demanded “[w]hy aren’t we taking advantage of this 
today?”61   
In a public meeting held in 2013, one alternative proposal offered was 
to foster an informed social discussion, and then allow citizens to inquire 
regarding their genetic mutations.62 In response, Stefánsson asked: “Is it 
sufficient that we tell the society that this information is obtainable or 
should we approach these women?” and then answered: “As an old 
fashioned physician, I am of the opinion that we have to approach them 
because the likelihood that they will get cancer and die from it is far too 
high for us to simply stand by and watch.”63 
In 2014 the Icelandic Parliament enacted legislation authorizing the 
Minister of Health to establish regulations regarding when and how an 
individual who participated in scientific research should be informed about 
IFs, but that the new provision did not address the issue of whether it 
should be undertaken with or without consent. This lack of clarity had left 
deCODE and the DPA in limbo, awaiting a political resolution, perhaps at 
an international level.64 Stefánsson acknowledged the need for a legislative 
 
 
57  Id. 
58  Petrone, DeCode Begins BRCA2 Mutation Service, supra note 1. 
59  Árnason, supra note 52, at 425. 
60  Id. (citation omitted). 
61  Petrone, In Iceland, Debate Simmers, supra note 4. 
62  Árnason, supra note 52, at 425. 
63  Id. (citation omitted).   
64  Petrone, In Iceland, Debate Simmers, supra note 4. 
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solution, conceding that the role of the DPA “is to protect privacy” rather 
than to “launch new healthcare services.”65   
While the DPA did not authorize contacting individuals about their 
imputed genetic information, nor did it oppose the release of such 
information where individuals explicitly request it. The Icelandic DPA has 
in fact acceded in the past to demands from people who have been 
genotyped and requested their information.66  Consequently, deCODE 
seized the opportunity to establish its website in spring 2018, informing 
inquirers whether they are positive or negative, a carrier or a non-carrier, 
and how to access genetic counseling. Within the first twenty-four hours 
of offering its service, about 20,000 people signed up, though by summer 
2018 only about 5,000 had registered to receive their status.67 Stefánsson 
stated that he had always predicted that “we would have relatively few 
people sign up on this website,” and expressed regret that making the 
service available on request only is not reaching as many people as he 
would like.  Noting that this mutation confers risk to relatively young 
people who “walk around with the illusion of immortality,” Stefánsson is 
pressing his case of making the BRCA2 data available to Icelanders via 
their electronic health records, even without express consent.68 
The Ministry of Health’s decision to decline to supply the information 
to Icelanders absent their express consent was formulated in light of the 
“right not to know.” This precept, enshrined in international regulations 
and norms, faces challenges as advances in genomic technology furnish 
unprecedented health information about people even in the absence of 
their personal participation in genomic research. 
V. GENOMIC RESEARCH AND THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW UNDER 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS AND NORMS 
During the early years of genetic testing, the right not to know was a 
norm, given the way that the industry operated. Just a decade ago, 
researchers generally collected only the data necessary to answer their 
specific scientific questions. More recently, however, large-scale genomic 
sequencing has become a powerful tool with the potential to revolutionize 
health care. In the process, it produces massive amounts of information, 
 
 
65  Id. 
66  Id.  
67  Petrone, DeCode Begins BRCA2 Mutation Service, supra note 1. 
68  Id. 
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including incidental findings.69 Legal instruments governing the right not 
to know were generally created, however, well before the emergence of 
large-scale genomic sequencing. 
In 1997, the UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights recognized the right of individuals “to decide whether 
or not to be informed of the results of genetic examination” and concluded 
that “the resulting consequences should be respected.”70 That same year, 
the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine declared that 
while “[e]veryone is entitled to know any information collected about his 
or her health,” nonetheless “the wishes of individuals not to be so 
informed shall be observed” because “[p]atients may have their own 
reasons for not wishing to know about certain aspects of their health.”71 In 
the United States around that same time, the National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission declared in 1999 that, specifically with respect to research 
involving human biological materials, “the disclosure of research results to 
subjects represents an exceptional circumstance.”72 Disclosure was 
allowable only if “a) the findings are scientifically valid and confirmed, b) 
the findings have significant implications for the subject’s health concerns, 
and c) a course of action to ameliorate or treat these concerns is readily 
available.”73 The American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics 
(“ACMG”), providing guidance in the clinical context, declared “patients 
should be given the option of not receiving certain or secondary 
findings.”74 
As Professor Berkman has explained, the RNTK began attracting 
increasing controversy as sequencing technology advanced and moved 
from the research setting into the clinical realm. This change arose from 
the fact that genomic sequencing was improving, leading to an increase in 
the number of genetic variants that could be strongly linked to medical 
conditions. Concomitantly, a greater number of patients were being 
sequenced, supporting the notion that genomic sequencing would have an 
 
 
69  Berkman, supra note 6, at 3-4. 
70  Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, Nov. 11, 1997, UNESCO 
Gen. Conf., 29th Sess., Res. 16, adopted and endorsed by the United Nations in G.A. Res. 53/152 
(Dec. 9, 1998). 
71  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard 
to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, art. 10.2, 
Apr. 4, 1997, E.T.S. 164, https://rm.coe.int/168007cf98. 
72  NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL 
MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 72 (1999).  
73  Id.  
74  AM. COLL. OF MED. GENETICS & GENOMICS, POLICY STATEMENT: POINTS TO CONSIDER IN 
THE CLINICAL APPLICATION OF GENOMIC SEQUENCING ¶ 8 
(2012), http://www.acmg.net/PDFLibrary/Genomic-Sequencing-Clinical-Application.pdf (emphasis 
omitted). 
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important role in clinical care.75 
It was in this context that the ACMG recommended that geneticists 
should test for and report incidental findings for a “minimal list” of fifty-
seven genes (later reduced to fifty-six) and twenty-four disorders, as these 
were considered the most verifiable by other diagnostic methods and 
amenable to prevention and/or treatment. In addition, the ACMG 
recommended such testing because individuals with these mutations might 
remain asymptomatic for long periods.76 The ACMG advocated 
proceeding without requesting a patient’s preferences, largely due to the 
concern that providing genetic counseling “will become increasingly 
unwieldy as clinical sequencing becomes more common and more 
commonly ordered by clinicians with varying levels of ability and 
experience in genetic counseling.”77 It should be noted that the ACMG 
recommendations explicitly referred to the clinical context, and expressly 
declined to address genomic sequencing done for research purposes.78  
The ACMG retracted its policy in 2013, the same year it had been 
made, acknowledging the “consensus view” among its members that 
“patients should have an opportunity to opt out of the analysis of 
medically actionable genes when undergoing whole exome or genome 
sequencing.”79 Nevertheless, this
 
incident demonstrates the unsettled 
nature of the RNTK, with the ACMG expressing its belief that the issues 
needed to evolve over time.80 In Iceland, the Ministry of Health chose to 
honor the RNTK, which troubled Stefánsson, all the more so given that so 
few Icelanders have registered to receive their BRCA2 status.81 This 
dilemma necessitates a closer analysis of the legal and ethical issues 
surrounding the three options considered by Icelandic government for the 
return of BRCA2 incidental findings. 
 
 
 
75  Berkman, supra note 6, at 12-13. 
76  Robert C. Green et al., ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental Findings in 
Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 15 GENETICS MED. 565, 566-68 (2013). 
77  Id. at 568.  
78  Id. at 569 (stating that “[a]lthough we hope that investigators find our process and these 
recommendations useful in their attempts to design thresholds and lists for the return of genomic 
findings to research participants, we did not design this list for that purpose,” and emphasizing that the 
recommendations were “for the situation in which a clinician orders exome or genome sequencing for 
a specific clinical indication”). 
79  Press Release, Am. Coll. of Med. Genetics & Genomics, ACMG Updates Recommendation 
on “Opt Out” for Genome Sequencing Return of Results, (Apr. 1, 2014), 
https://www.acmg.net/docs/Release_ACMGUpdatesRecommendations_final.pdf.  
80  See id. 
81  See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  
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VI. THE THREE POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO THE RELEASE OF 
IMPUTED GENETIC DATA CONSIDERED BY THE ICELANDIC GOVERNMENT 
Professor Árnason highlights the ethical quandary facing society in 
Iceland, where researchers are able to identify individuals at a relatively 
high risk of developing serious conditions such as breast cancer, but have 
“no channels” to convey this information.82 He delineates the three 
possible approaches to this dilemma considered in Iceland: (1) to do 
nothing; (2) to make it publicly known that the information is available 
and thus to enable individuals to take the initiative to request that 
information for themselves; or (3) to contact the affected individuals 
directly and inform them that researchers possess information relevant to 
their health, which is the approach favored by the CEO of deCODE 
Genetics.83 Each of these approaches requires analysis in light of the 
broader policy considerations and the considerable literature relating to the 
RNTK. 
 A. Arguments Against Returning Incidental Findings  
There are numerous compelling arguments against the return of the 
BRCA2 research results, even when all of the following preconditions are 
met, as they are in the case of deCODE’s IFs relating to the presence of 
the BRCA2 mutation in many Icelanders: 1) the genetic health finding 
clearly presents an established health risk to the individual; 2) the genetic 
finding is actionable, meaning that therapeutic or preventive measures are 
available; and 3) there is no clear indication that the individual prefers not 
to receive the results.84 
From the perspective of the data contributor, the return of IFs, where 
consent has not been explicitly requested and obtained, could be said to 
threaten individual autonomy and privacy. Conversely, from the 
perspective of the research community, significant burdens would befall 
them if the return of IFs were mandated. 
In the field of biomedical research, the principle of autonomy, or self-
determination, suggests that each individual has the right not to know 
selected information about herself.85 Because genetic information can 
 
 
82  Árnason, supra note 52, at 425-26. 
83  See id. at 426-29. 
84  For a discussion of the importance of these factors when considering the return of IFs, see 
generally Wolf et al., supra note 11.  
85 See, e.g., Bartha M. Knoppers, Introduction: From the Right to Know to the Right Not to 
Know, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 6, 6 (2014) (“Respect for the autonomy of research participants 
recognizes that all individuals have the right to make their own decisions.”); ANTICIPATE AND 
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cause psychological and economic harm, individuals ought to have the 
freedom to weigh the risk of harm against potential benefits they may 
glean from the information.86 Proponents of the right not to know decry 
paternalism in medical care. For example, when the American College of 
Medical Genetics proposed in 2013 to mandate testing by its members for 
certain mutations,87 this proposal ultimately failed, in large measure 
because it represented an example of medical paternalism that is no longer 
accepted.88 
In addition to autonomy, the right of privacy supports the notion that an 
individual has the right not to be identified individually and linked to her 
genetic profile, whether in her own mind of the mind of others. Professor 
Laurie notes that it can be a violation of privacy to receive information 
about oneself from another.89 Laurie describes privacy as “being in a state 
of (psychological) separateness from others,” and explains that disclosure 
will have consequences for the individual and others, but the “individual 
who is the focus of our attention is the very person who is removed from 
having a say in the outcome,” such that “a core sense of self can be 
fundamentally affected – potentially in an adverse way – by information 
disclosure.”90 
Revelation of negative genetic information may lead not only to 
anxiety and depression within the individual, but also may give rise to 
stigma and even discrimination in areas such as employment and 
insurance.91 Indeed, it is this very notion of genetic privacy that undergirds 
 
 
COMMUNICATE, supra note 11, at 59 (“The autonomous patient also has a right not to know selected 
information and should be able to exercise this right (to the extent possible.).”). 
86  Berkman, supra note 6, at 23.  
87  See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
88  See, e.g., Anne Townsend et al., Paternalism and the ACMG Recommendations on Genomic 
Incidental Findings: Patients Seen But Not Heard, 15 GENETICS MED. 751, 751 (2013) (“The 
traditionally paternalistic model of medicine, underpinned by values and assumptions about passive 
patient and authoritative physician roles, is increasingly criticized by patients, advocacy groups, health 
policy makers, and many physicians.”); see also Tuija Takala, Genetic Ignorance and Reasonable 
Paternalism, 22 THEORETICAL MED. BIOETHICS 485, 490 (2001) (stating that individual autonomy 
should be insulated from societal judgment and paternalistic views based upon the purportedly 
objective notion of “what a reasonable person would do”).  
89  Graeme Laurie, In Defence of Ignorance: Genetic Information and the Right Not to Know, 6 
EUR. J. HEALTH L. 119, 119-120 (1999).  
90  Graeme Laurie, Privacy and the Right Not to Know: A Plea for Conceptual Clarity, in THE 
RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE RIGHT NOT TO KNOW 38, 41 (Ruth Chadwick et al. eds., 2014). 
91  See, e.g., Kirke D. Weaver, Genetic Screening and the Right Not to Know, 13 ISSUES L. & 
MED. 243, 243 (1997) (“[S]uch knowledge can lead to anxious preoccupation with the ever present 
disease potential within, and discrimination by employers, insurers, governmental agencies, and health 
care providers without.”). See also Clarissa Allen et al., Defining the Scope of Public Engagement: 
Examining the “Right Not to Know” in Public Health Genomics, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 11, 15 (2014) 
(cautioning that revelation of genetic information particularly endangers members of “traditionally 
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the Icelandic Data Protection Authority’s requirement that deCODE, when 
generating imputed data, would make use of statistical results but delete 
data that is individually identifiable.92 
A further privacy argument rests on the notion that individuals have the 
right to refuse medical treatment. One group of bioethics scholars states 
that the ACMG recommendations impinged on a mentally competent 
patient’s “virtually unlimited” right to refuse treatment, noting that “any 
patient accepting [whole genome sequencing] for a clinical indication 
must also accept analysis of the 56 genes. . . .”93 As noted by Berkman, the 
right to refuse medical treatment rests upon common-law informed 
consent jurisprudence and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process 
liberty interests,94 and he cites cases where courts have held that there is a 
constitutionally protected interest in rejecting medical care.95 However, 
Berkman claims that cases upholding the right to refuse medical treatment 
all rest upon the right to bodily integrity, not psychological integrity, and 
that this distinction therefore undercuts the notion that the right to refuse 
treatment supports a RNTK.96 In support of this argument, Berkman cites 
specific laws that in fact require people to receive unsettling medical 
information, including state laws requiring women seeking abortions to 
receive various kinds of knowledge about the fetus they are carrying 
(including gestational age and an ultrasound image); mandating that 
plaintiffs in toxic tort cases undergo court-ordered genetic testing; and 
requiring HIV testing and/or disclosure of HIV status.97 These arguments 
are not effective, however, in defeating a person’s privacy interest in the 
RNTK her genetic mutations, because in the examples given the individual 
required to undergo the testing seeks to assert rights that arguably will 
impact another, whether a fetus, a toxic tort defendant, or a potential 
sexual partner. Berkman was not considering, and the same interests do 
not lie in, a case where a person is being offered imputed genetic 
information, as in the deCODE BRCA2 scenario. What is more, the cases 
cited by Berkman generally deal with medical conditions that are actually 
present, such a pregnancy or HIV, rather than the risk of genetic condition, 
which is much less certain, and therefore entails a stronger RNTK. 
 
 
marginalized groups,” who are often at greater risk of health problems “due to a higher exposure to 
environmental risk factors”).  
92  See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
93  Wylie Burke et al., Recommendations for Returning Genomic Incidental Findings? We Need 
to Talk!, 15 GENETICS MED. 854, 856 (2013). 
94  Berkman, supra note 6, at 36. 
95  Id. at 36 n.206 (citations omitted).  
96  Id. at 36-40. 
97  Id. at 41-45, 48-50. 
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Like the cases dealing with the required receipt of unsettling 
information, the duty to warn cases analyzing the obligations of medical 
professionals to warn patients similarly fail to support the notion that 
researchers have a duty to inform an individual of her genetic risk factors. 
As noted by one expert, the ethical issues raised are not new in that “in 
clinical genetics, when you genotype family members, you can say in 
some cases with certainty that another family member will be a carrier of a 
certain dominant disease; however, you are not permitted to inform them 
of this without consent.”98 Generally, under our health care model, the 
decision to share tests results rests with the first family member tested, 
meaning that some or all relatives may lack access to the information that 
may affect their own health care.99 Past duty to warn cases, which involve 
a medical professional’s duty to warn family members of hereditary health 
risks and weigh a patient’s rights of autonomy and privacy against third-
party interests,100 do not stand in contradiction to the prevailing norm 
protecting individual privacy. One case addressing the duty to warn found 
a duty to warn a patient about the genetic basis of her disease so that she 
could inform her relatives, but held that a physician could discharge this 
duty simply by informing the patient.101 In another case considering 
whether a physician had to warn at-risk relatives of a patient with a 
hereditary disease, the court held that simply disclosing the information to 
the patient might not discharge the physician’s duty to warn.102 However, 
this case was subsequently overturned by the New Jersey legislature,103 
 
 
98  Petrone, In Iceland, Debate Simmers, supra note 4. 
99  Mary B. Daly et al., Communicating Genetic Test Results Within the Family: Is It Lost in 
Translation? A Survey of Relatives in the Randomized Six-Step Study, 15 FAMILIAL CANCER 697, 701 
(2016). 
100 Berkman, supra note 6, at 46-47. 
101 Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 280-82 (Fla. 1995). In this case, a physician had performed 
surgery on the plaintiff's mother for medullary thyroid carcinoma but had failed to warn his patient 
about the need for her children to be tested for this genetically transmissible condition. The plaintiff 
argued that, as a result of this failure to warn, she was not tested early enough to prevent her 
development of medullary thyroid cancer. Id. at 279. The issue before the court was whether a 
physician owes “a duty of care to the children of a patient to warn the patient of the genetically 
transferable nature of the condition for which the physician is treating the patient[.]” Id. 
102 Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192-93 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). In this 
case, the physician had treated the plaintiff's father for a precancerous disease known as multiple 
polyposis of the colon, from which he later died in the early 1960s. Id. at 1189-90. Thirty years later, 
the plaintiff developed the same condition. Id. at 1190. After having obtained her father's medical 
records, which revealed that he had suffered from the same disease that she had, the daughter filed suit 
in 1992 alleging that the doctor had violated a duty of care by failing to warn her of the risk to her 
health. Id. 
103 N.J. STAT ANN. § 10:5-47 (West 2007) (limiting, but not nullifying, the disclosure by 
physicians of genetic information without the consent of the plaintiff). 
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has not been widely followed, and has occasioned academic criticism.104 
While the arguments presented thus far consider the RNTK from the 
perspective of the individual about whom IFs have been revealed, a 
complementary set of arguments in favor of the RNTK assumes the 
perspective of researchers who conduct genomic research, recognizing that 
the goals of clinical care and population database research differ greatly.105 
As noted by Professor Simm of the University of Tartu in Estonia,  “while 
it might have been relatively straightforward for the radiologist to contact 
the patient or patient’s physician regarding incidental finds, the matter is 
much more complicated for researchers far removed (both institutionally 
and geographically) from the biological owners of mostly anonymized 
samples.”106 Providing this information would certainly be costly, and it is 
not clear which party should bear the burden of the cost.107 
Another challenge facing researchers and bio-specimen donors alike is 
the danger inherent in conflating research scientists with physicians, such 
that imposition of a duty to return feedback could “lead to the 
strengthening of therapeutic misconception: a mistaken perception of the 
research participants that they are being cured and cared for.”108 As noted 
by Árnason, when Stefánsson refers to himself as an “old fashioned 
physician,”109 he conflates the two concepts in a way that can certainly 
confuse potential research participants as to the fundamentally arm’s-
length relationship between a research participant and her researcher.110 
Indeed, U.S. case law has firmly established that a researcher does not owe 
to a research participant the duties that a doctor would owe to her 
patient.111 Thus, there is a strong argument for the traditional separation of 
the domains of clinical care, which focuses on treating the individual, and 
research, which aims for the creation of new knowledge for the benefit of 
future generations.  In this view, it is natural that distinct ethical principles 
guide these two domains, with beneficence and the avoidance of harm 
important for clinical care, whereas the development and dissemination of 
 
 
104 Berkman, supra note 6, at 47-48. 
105 Árnason, supra note 52, at 426. 
106 Simm, supra note 10, at 55. 
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109 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.  
110 Árnason, supra note 52, at 426. 
111 See, e.g., Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 
1072 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (declining to hold that researchers owe a fiduciary duty to donors of bio-
specimens and genetic data); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 486 (Cal. 1990) 
(holding that, absent a physician-patient relationship, researchers do not owe a fiduciary duty to donors 
of bio-specimens and data).  
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information are crucial for research.112 
As a practical matter, there are significant constraints on the ability of 
researchers to establish reliable criteria for selecting which genetic IFs to 
offer. The BRCA2 gene associated with breast and ovarian cancer may 
seem to be an easy case, as there is a clear link between this mutation and 
the disease, and prophylactic mastectomy has proved to be one effective 
approach for some patients. In fact, the suggestion of directly contacting 
individuals with the BRCA2 mutation has met with much criticism in 
Iceland for several reasons. Árnason explains that the population genetic 
results derive only partially from whole-genome association studies and 
rely instead on statistical imputation, thereby failing to provide accurate 
information about the number of people who carry the BRCA2 
transmutation.113 Second, even for a well-characterized gene such as 
BRCA2, there are variants of indeterminate significance.114 Third, the 
available treatment is invasive and is not certain to succeed, so there is 
concern that revelation of the information will engender unnecessary 
interventions. Finally, the Icelandic the national health service is already 
facing limited resources, and a focus on this particular disease may not be 
the most efficient use of those resources.115  
A case profiled in the New York Times demonstrates the difficulties 
involved in revealing genetic risk factors, even with the help of a genetic 
counselor. One recent article cited the case of Jennifer, a healthy thirty-
nine-year-old woman with a family history of breast cancer who decided 
to be tested for mutations in two genes associated with the disease. When 
a genetic counselor offered her additional tests for twenty other diseases 
linked to various cancers, Jennifer accepted, believing that more 
information would only be useful. She described the results as “surreal,” 
however. While Jennifer did not have mutations in the breast cancer genes, 
she did have a mutation in a gene linked to a high rate of stomach cancer. 
Because she did not have a family history of the disease, the significance 
of this finding was uncertain, even as the mutation is considered so risky 
among patients with a family history of the disease that they are often 
advised to have their stomachs excised prophylactically.116 While this 
 
 
112 See Árnason, supra note 52, at 426. 
113 Id. at 425. 
114 Bjørn Hofmann, Incidental Findings of Uncertain Significance: To Know or Not To Know – 
That Is the Question, 17 BMC MED. ETHICS 2 (2016), 
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situation arose in the context of elective genetic testing, it could just as 
easily occur if estimated data were returned to people who had not chosen 
to undergo such testing. 
As noted by Hofmann, because what is revealed is not certain 
knowledge, but rather risk information that causes considerable 
uncertainty, “it is fair to ask whether Jennifer has a right to be ignorant.”117 
He emphasizes that it is critical to distinguish between findings that will 
be of value to the patient and those he deems incidental findings of 
uncertain significance (“IFUS”). Furnishing the latter is not beneficent, in 
light of the fact that the predictive accuracy of such information may be 
poor or nonexistent, and actionability is speculative.118   
 B. Arguments in Favor of Making It Publicly Known That Imputed 
Genetic Information Is Available and Inviting Individuals to Request 
Information Themselves 
There are several arguments in support of the notion that researchers 
ought to make it publicly known that imputed genetic information is 
available and invite requests for such information, even absent a prior 
informed consent process. Some experts contend that a person’s autonomy 
is actually preserved, rather than undermined, by receiving genetic 
information about herself. As explained by Vayena and Tasioulas in the 
context of the ACMG’s proposal to return IFs to patients,119 “it is arguable 
that the proposed ACMG regime for incidental findings actually enhances 
patient autonomy” by “generating a fuller menu of worthwhile options 
from which patients can make life-shaping (including life-saving) 
choices.”120 Icelanders affected by the BRCA2 mutation, if offered 
information about their health, could choose prophylactic measures such 
as an elective mastectomy, and also monitor their health more closely. 
Although paternalism can be used as an argument against returning IFs,121 
it should be noted that there are “paternalistic undertones” as well when 
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117 Hofmann, supra note 114, at 2. 
118 Id. at 3. 
119 See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.  
120 Effy Vayena & John Tasioulas, Genetic Incidental Findings: Autonomy Regained?, 15 
GENETICS MED. 868, 868 (2013). See also Berkman, supra note 6, at 30-31 (observing that autonomy 
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24, 27 (Ruth Chadwick et al. eds., 2014) (stating, in the context of unsolicited disclosure to relatives, 
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the concept of avoidance of harm is invoked as an argument against 
disclosure of IFs.122 Paternalism is particularly suspect when viewed in the 
context of dominant and marginalized groups. For example, a group of 
experts who have argued for population level BRCA screening maintain 
that “[w]omen do not benefit by practices that ‘protect’ them from 
information regarding their own health.”123   
Commentators also critique the privacy argument raised by those who 
oppose the revelation of IFs. Skopek contends that although “large scale 
data analysis may allow us to infer facts about people that they would 
rather keep secret, and thereby cause them privacy losses, such inferences 
should not be treated as privacy violations.”124 This aligns with the view of 
deCODE’s Dr. Stefánsson, who contends that detecting IFs through 
estimated data does not violate a person’s privacy because it is not actually 
sequencing her DNA or collecting personal information from her, but 
rather forming “conjectures” or “hypotheses” about the person.125 
Stefánsson explains that estimated DNA sequences, unlike directly 
measured sequences, are not very accurate for individuals, though they are 
valuable at the group level.126 For example, as noted by Craig Venter of 
the biotechnology firm Celera Inc., which published the complete 
sequence of his genome in 2007, although his genomic data indicates an 
increased statistical risk of developing Alzheimer’s disease, he was not 
surprised that his brain scan results were negative for early signs of the 
disease. “What works statistically for a population with genomics does not 
work statistically for individuals. Either you have something or you don’t. 
You don’t have 30 percent of Alzheimer’s.”127  
Those who advocate for inviting individuals to learn more about their 
IFs also minimize the dangers of conflating the duties of researchers and 
clinicians.128 As explained by Wolf et al., at least in cases where 
contributors are asked to consent to use of their samples and data in a 
biobank (as opposed to situations where contributors are never asked for 
consent because their samples and data are deidentified and therefore used 
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in research that is not considered human subjects research), these 
contributors may expect to be offered IFs, particularly where a specified 
disease is being studied, and “may misconstrue research silence as an 
indication that there are no findings of individual health concern.”129 Even 
when individuals are not directly involved in contributing to a biobank and 
their data is instead imputed, individuals may expect the return of their 
IFs. This may be especially true in a small, sparsely populated country 
with nationalized health care, such as Iceland. However, a growing body 
of survey evidence from the United States indicates that even in a large, 
diverse nation without nationalized health care, “many individuals want 
and even expect to receive” their IFs, especially where researchers reveal 
genetic mutations with significant health implications.130 Indeed, a failure 
to return results could lead to mistrust of researchers and impede their 
access to genetic specimens and data if individuals feel wary of 
researchers who remain impervious to concerns about the health of their 
subjects.131 In order to minimize any negative effects arising from the 
conflation of researchers and clinicians by the recipient of genetic 
information, these recipients could be reminded to seek the advice of their 
health care professionals,132 and that such findings were simply incidental 
to the main purpose of the research, which is to reveal, through the study 
of large groups, potential causes, diagnoses, treatments, and cures for 
diseases having a genetic component.  
Offering research results to individuals achieves more than simply 
meeting their expectations and/or avoiding their disaffection. Simm 
explains that the very nature of medical care and research are undergoing a 
seismic shift, ushering in an era of “participatory medicine” and the rise of 
medical innovation in clinical settings, necessitating a model of 
researcher-subject relations that encompasses reciprocity.133   
This notion of participatory medicine gets to the heart of why offering 
IFs could be beneficial, and to the very purpose of genetic research itself. 
 
 
129 Wolf et al., supra note 11, at 366 (citations omitted). 
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As explained by Vayena and Tasioulas, informing individuals of 
incidental genetic findings not only enables “the pursuit of improved 
health outcomes” for the affected individuals, but also benefits “the 
patient's relatives and serve[s] the common good of promoting a healthy 
society.”134 Indeed, Rosamond Rhodes argues that we owe a moral 
obligation to ourselves and to one another to pursue all relevant genetic 
knowledge, without being distracted by emotions such as fear or a false 
sense of security, in order to foster our own health, as well as that of our 
family members and the wider community.135 
What is more, commentators contend that the incidence of 
psychosocial harm from revealed genetic information is actually lower 
than expected. For example, Berkman cites research supporting his view 
that individuals are much more resilient when receiving negative health 
information than even they would predict.136 In terms of economic harms 
to the individual about whom genetic information has been revealed, 
Berkman cites the paucity of litigation in the United States under the 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA),137 enacted in 2008, 
in support of the notion that “perhaps there is less cause for concern than 
previously thought.”138 It should be noted that lack of litigation under 
GINA, which prohibits employers and health insurance companies from 
receiving and using genetic risk information (as opposed to an actual 
disease) as the basis for employment and actuarial decisions, does not 
establish that genetic discrimination is not occurring, and GINA has also 
been criticized for not covering other areas of potential genetic 
discrimination, such as life insurance and long-term care insurance.139 
Nonetheless, when considering the harms incurred by conveying negative 
genetic information to individuals who have not affirmed their desire to 
receive it, it is important to remember that the alternative scenario is not 
one completely free from harm, but rather holds the potential for the 
anguish that may arise when a person is diagnosed with a serious medical 
condition and realizes that it could possibly have been caught and treated 
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135 See generally Rosamond Rhodes, Genetic Links, Family Ties, and Social Bonds: Rights and 
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earlier, had the information been available to her.  
The danger of psychological harm is faced not only by those 
individuals about whom genetic information is known. Berkman points 
out that, if prohibited from offering genetic information to individuals, 
some researchers may experience “moral distress,” which refers to the 
situation where “one knows the morally correct course of action, but is 
constrained from taking it.”140 While one might expect moral distress to be 
more prevalent for clinicians and researchers who deal directly with the 
people they are treating and studying, as opposed to researchers who 
develop estimated data and deal at a distance with the individuals they 
study, deCODE CEO Stefánsson appears to exhibit a significant amount of 
moral distress himself when he describes his desire to contact Icelanders 
affected by the BRCA2 mutation thus: “As an old fashioned physician, I 
am of the opinion that we have to approach them because the likelihood 
that they will get cancer and die from it is far too high for us to simply 
stand by and watch.”141 Describing the lasting negative impact that 
experiencing moral distress can have upon medical practitioners, Berkman 
credits Epstein and Delgado for coining the termed “moral residue.”142 
Given that medical professionals are charged with preventing and 
ameliorating disease, they are likely to suffer negative impacts upon their 
sense of self and their feelings about their profession if they are barred 
from sharing with research participants vital health information.143  
In addition, while medical professionals may seem to support the 
RNTK, Berkman points that such support may actually be weaker than it 
seems, if one takes into account the “identified life” factor.144 For 
example, one 2014 survey of genetics professionals throughout the United 
States indicated that only 19% of them believed that they would return IFs 
regardless of the individual patient’s preferences.145 However, when a 
specific, identified person’s life is in danger, this number can change 
dramatically, as evidenced by a survey of 800 institutional review board 
members from 2015.146 When asked about the RNTK in the abstract, 
whether “it would be acceptable for [research participants] to choose not 
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to receive” genetic incidental findings, 96% agreed.147 The answer to this 
question changed, however, when these same survey respondents were 
presented with the case of a specific patient who was undergoing genomic 
sequencing for a suspected rare genetic disorder and had expressly chosen 
not to receive incidental findings, but evidenced a high genetic risk of a 
serious and actionable form of colon cancer. In this case, 26% of 
respondents replied that researchers should definitely or probably disclose 
the finding, while only 63% felt that researchers should definitely not or 
probably not disclose the finding, with the remaining 11% unsure.148 This 
survey demonstrates how the RNTK is less strictly regarded where 
medical professionals see the opportunity to save a specific human life, 
even in cases where patients have actually expressed that they do not want 
to know their IFs. We would expect the identified life effect to operate 
particularly strongly in culturally homogeneous and sparsely populated 
Iceland, where people are often distantly related to one another. Even in 
countries with larger and more heterogeneous populations, it is clear that 
the RNTK will be less compelling where people have not expressed any 
wish whatsoever about their RNTK, as in the case of imputed genomic 
data. This is all the more true as advances in medicine promise treatments 
and cures for an increasing number of genetic diseases.   
In arguing for the return of research results, commentators also critique 
the notion of genetic exceptionalism, contending that there is no justifiable 
reason to treat unexpected genetic information any differently than other 
unexpected medical information. Berkman cites the example of a patient 
who receives a routine blood panel to check for one condition, perhaps 
hypertension, but then learns that the results indicate a serious acute 
problem such as impending renal failure. He emphasizes that “the 
physician isn’t going to ask before disclosing this urgent finding.”149 
While acknowledging that the analogy is imperfect because genetic 
findings are merely statistical probabilities rather than diagnostic 
certainties, and genetic mutations are not typically associated with 
conditions that require immediate attention, Berkman nonetheless urges 
careful questioning as to whether genetic information truly “warrants 
special treatment.”150 The analogy to typical medical screenings is 
particularly inapposite in the case of estimated data, however, since the 
individual whose genetic information has been revealed has not willingly 
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undergone any medical screening. Yet, the argument against genetic 
exceptionalism still holds some force. Given that the emergence of big 
data has made so much information, including genetic information, 
accessible, it is pertinent to ask whether the manner in which information 
was revealed matters much in deciding whether to provide that 
information to the affected person. 
Those who agree that the availability of imputed genetic information 
ought to be conveyed to individuals facing genetic risks nonetheless 
disagree as to the dangers in providing the information directly to the 
individual. Those who advocate for a public service campaign informing 
citizens of the existence of such information and inviting them to access 
the data contend that it is preferable to give them an opportunity to make 
arrangements for genetic counseling, rather than contacting people directly 
with their specific information, the option discussed below.151 As noted by 
Árnason, “[r]eceiving information about risk without professional 
interpretation and possibly against one’s wishes is not conducive to 
autonomy,”152 and he recommends that people get information through a 
genetic counselor so that they can make informed medical choices with the 
proper emotional support.153 Similarly, one recent literature review of 
whole-genome and whole-exome sequencing in families with a suspected 
genetic disorder found that members of all stakeholder groups stressed the 
importance of genetic counseling at the time of disclosure of IFs. Both 
providers and recipients of the information stressed the necessity for face-
to-face meetings with a genetics professional who could tailor the 
information to the participant, in terms of both content and timing.154 This 
research also indicated that stakeholder groups across many studies 
stressed the importance of discussing IFs during the pretest process,155 a 
scenario that is not feasible where the IFs are revealed via estimated data. 
For this reason, it is important to provide imputed data in a way that 
permits affected individuals to be emotionally prepared and make prior 
arrangements, if they wish, for genetic counseling. 
DeCODE CEO Dr. Stefánsson has himself acknowledged the problems 
with communicating findings from biobank research directly to the 
research participant. He and his colleague explain that “the discovery of a 
mutation in a gene that is found in one hundred per cent of patients with a 
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154 Michael P. Mackley et al., Stakeholder Views on Secondary Findings in Whole-Genome and 
Whole-Exome Sequencing: A Systematic Review of Quantitative and Qualitative Studies, 19 GENETICS 
IN MED. 283, 288 (2017). 
155 Id. at 286-287. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
2019]   THE ETHICS OF BIG DATA IN GENOMICS   381 
 
 
 
 
certain disease does not tell us, for a given number of patients with the 
mutation, what proportion will develop the disease, nor how reliable the 
test for the mutation is,” and therefore “[a] basic discovery should always 
be validated clinically before it is made known to individuals.”156 
Nonetheless, deCODE continues to advocate for contacting individuals 
directly to provide the precise information about their BRCA2 status. 
 C. Arguments in Favor of Contacting Affected Individuals Directly to 
Inform Them That Researchers Possess Information Relevant to Their 
Health 
The main argument for providing imputed IFs directly to individuals is 
that early detection is critical in treating many genetic conditions, such as 
breast and ovarian cancer arising from the BRCA2 mutation. As noted 
previously, only about 5,000 Icelanders have registered to receive their 
BRCA2 status.157 Giving deCODE permission to contact the affected 
individuals directly would be a rapid and certain method of providing the 
information, which could lead to a better prognosis for many patients. 
Preventative mastectomy reduces the likelihood of breast cancer from 72% 
down to 5%, and therefore Stefánsson urges that “it is a merciless view to 
come to a conclusion that we should not approach these women.”158 
Wolf and colleagues, in considering furnishing IFs directly to those 
who have personally contributed bio-specimens and data for research, note 
that providing the results directly to the individual respects her autonomy 
and privacy.159 One possible compromise suggested is to ask individuals, 
at the same time that they are asked if they would like return of IFs 
detected through imputed data, whether they would like to receive such 
information directly or would prefer that it be sent to their primary care 
physician or another designated clinician.160 It avoids the issue of 
paternalism discussed above,161 in that the recipient of the IF information 
is presumed to be capable of handling it. For imputed genetic findings, 
however, there is no such clear opportunity to request informed consent. 
Providing information directly to the individuals rather than indirectly 
through a public service campaign also avoids one particular practical 
challenge, in that those people who already know that they are at risk for 
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genetic disorders are more likely to seek out such information. Other 
individuals, who may be affected by very rare and serious disorders, may 
not be aware of this fact and may not inquire, which makes the direct 
provision of information to them all the more crucial.162  
The mandatory provision of health risk information has been 
implemented in some states with respect to HIV/AIDS.  These 
jurisdictions therefore provide a useful case study for the scenario 
contemplated by deCODE.  
VII. AN EXAMPLE OF MANDATORY REVELATION OF HEALTH RISK 
INFORMATION: HIV/AIDS 
In the context of HIV/AIDS, the law of several jurisdictions requires 
medical professionals to provide health risk information to individuals, 
without explicitly requiring consent. Several states and some cities have 
enacted laws requiring health care providers to inform needle-sharing or 
sexual partners of HIV positive people of the HIV status of the affected 
individual.163 As noted by one commentator, “[o]n a spectrum that puts 
individual patient confidentiality on one end and public health protection 
on the other, New York may have one of the most aggressive statutes to 
protect the public.”164   
The New York HIV partner notification statute imposes an affirmative 
duty on every physician or health care provider authorized to diagnose 
HIV/AIDS to report the positive status of individuals to the state health 
commissioner along with the names of any identified spouse, sex partner, 
or needle-sharing partner.165 Once the report is received, the names are 
then referred to the local health authority so that listed partners may be 
notified.166   
The purpose of New York's law is to protect the health of the sexual 
and needle-sharing partners of the HIV-positive individual by informing 
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names of sex and needle-sharing partners of people who test HIV positive that are known to the 
doctor”). 
166 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2130 (McKinney 2010).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
2019]   THE ETHICS OF BIG DATA IN GENOMICS   383 
 
 
 
 
them of their risk and recommending HIV testing.167 These sexual and 
needle-sharing partners overwhelmingly approved their receipt of this 
information, with one study showing that 87% of the 132 partners of HIV-
positive individuals located throughout New York State thought the 
Department of Health did the right thing in telling them about their 
exposure, and 92% thought that the Department of Health “should 
continue to notify persons exposed to HIV.”168 The risk of HIV exposure 
is not analogous to genetic risk, however, in that HIV is an infectious 
disease that can be readily diagnosed, and for which early detection and 
treatment are clearly beneficial. The analogy to HIV exposure is not strong 
enough to justify contacting individuals to tell them directly of their 
genetic imputed findings absent their informed consent. 
VIII. A WAY FORWARD FOR CONTRIBUTED AND IMPUTED DATA 
There is a growing agreement that researchers ought to determine in 
advance and make clear to participants whether incidental findings will be 
offered back to participants. Currently, most biobanks have no 
mechanisms in place for disclosing information to donors. A recent study 
of eighty-five biobanks concluded that the issue of return of results was 
not addressed in their public documents. In recent years, more biobanks 
have started to ask donors whether they would like to have feedback. But 
this prospective process does not take into account all the biobanks that 
were established without disclosure policies.169  
Professor Árnason notes that an Icelandic committee has been working 
on behalf of the Minister of Welfare to craft regulations concerning the 
sharing of health-related information with participants who contribute 
directly to biobanks. While the proposals are being maintained as 
confidential since they are still in development, one proposal does provide 
that researchers are obligated, on a prospective basis, to request and honor 
research participants’ preference regarding whether they want to receive 
incidental information that is important for their health, regardless of 
whether their condition is amenable to medical treatment.170  
As to the retrospective question of how to proceed in the case where 
biobank contributors did not contemplate the return of their individual 
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information, the Icelandic committee recommends a case-by-case analysis. 
If a researcher has results concerning a serious health risk for participants, 
the responsible primary investigator is required to apply to the Icelandic 
National Bioethics Committee (“NBC”) for permission to have the 
information conveyed to the participants. The NBC will then set up an 
independent group in order to determine if and how the information should 
be returned to the individual.171 
With respect to estimated data, however, researchers cannot easily 
obtain consent, as they are not in contact with individuals about whom 
genetic data is revealed. In a small country with nationalized health care 
such as Iceland, however, it is possible for a central entity such as the 
Ministry of Health to prospectively seek citizens’ consent to receive 
genetic information if it is imputed from large-scale genetic research. 
Citizens could be required to affirmatively opt in so as to receive the 
information. This points to a possible solution for the future, if individuals 
would sign a consent form that promised IFs. There is data indicating that 
they would. A recent survey in an Icelandic medical journal found that 
90% of women felt “positive or very positive” about using existing genetic 
information obtained through research to inform individuals of their 
mutation status, although half of the respondents expressed concern that a 
positive result might affect their health insurance.172 Similarly, in Estonia, 
83% of the potential participants in the Estonian biobank173 wanted to 
receive their own personal gene map.  The majority of Estonian citizens 
have expressed interest in disclosure of both general and individual 
research results.174 
There are significant challenges, however, to the goal of establishing a 
system that explicitly requests consent from all its citizens for the return of 
imputed genetic information. First, there is the difficulty of reaching each 
individual to ascertain her preferences. With an opt-in system, the failure 
of an individual to opt in does not necessarily indicate a lack of desire to 
receive imputed information, but rather may simply indicate a failure to 
reach that person or confusion on the individual’s part. Second, the costs 
of contacting each individual could hobble research. As noted by Clayton 
and Maguire, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
declined to proceed with genetic research due to the cost of obtaining 
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informed consent, estimated in the millions of dollars in the 1990s, from 
contributors of re-identified stored tissue samples whose consent had not 
been obtained initially due to the de-identification of the data.175 Third, 
even if an individual does indicate her assent to receive the information, it 
is possible that she does not have a clear understanding of what she agreed 
to and its implications, given that is it not certain that any information will 
ever be forthcoming, and the complexity of the information itself, which 
pertains to statistical risk factors rather than certain diagnoses. Fourth, as 
noted by Berkman, people’s preferences are likely to change over time, 
“[b]ut unless the medical world can develop a process for actively re-
soliciting preferences (an unrealistic proposition) there is the very real risk 
that a binding decision made at a single point in time could become 
inconsistent with future desires.”176 A fifth potential obstacle to returning 
this information is the magnitude of the scientific challenge facing 
researchers. In 2012, investigators indicated that there were over 100,000 
genetic variants cited in the medical literature, and they proceeded to 
analyze the proportion of known genetic variants that would meet 
generally established criteria for disclosure.177 These researchers found 
that between 6.9% to 10.6% of genetic variants would meet the 
requirements for disclosure to research participants, meaning somewhere 
between 4,000 to 17,000 variants. They further found that if the growth 
rate from the four years preceding the study were to continue, the total 
number of disease-associated variants would grow 37% over the next four 
years, such that researchers would be responsible for disclosing over 
16,000 variants by 2015. Even when the variants are identified, the 
scientific review process to assess the criteria for each of these variants 
would be quite complex.178 One possible approach recommended by these 
researchers is to develop an “empirically informed” set of guidelines for 
the return of results, something the U.S. National Institutes of Health is 
attempting to achieve.179 A final challenge surrounding the goal of 
establishing a system that explicitly requests consent from all its citizens 
for the return of imputed genetic information is that researchers generally 
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do not have access to genetic counselors, nor the funds to hire such 
professionals.180 
The way forward must be an international solution, given that genetic 
data is often generated and shared across national borders.181 In order to 
encourage individuals to request genetic information that researchers may 
have collected about them, it is necessary to start with an informed public 
dialogue and public service announcements so that citizens are aware that 
such data is available.  
It is clear that public discussion of genetic testing does increase 
awareness and encourages more people to be tested. For example, during 
the period in May 2013 immediately after the public figure Angelina Jolie 
published a widely read New York Times editorial announcing her decision 
to undergo preventive mastectomy due to her BRCA2 genetic mutation, 
there was an immediate increase in BRCA testing rates among U.S. 
women aged eighteen to sixty-four. This increase persisted through the 
year of 2013.  However, there is some evidence that this sort of publicity 
may not effectively target the subpopulations that are more at risk for the 
relevant underlying condition. This is demonstrated by the fact that sixty-
day mastectomy rates among women who had a BRCA test fell from 10% 
in the months before publication to 7% in the months after publication, 
suggesting that women who underwent tests as a result of the editorial had 
a lower pre-test probability of having the BRCA mutation than women 
tested before the editorial.182   
An examination of racial disparities in health outcomes in the U.S. for 
African-American and Caucasian-American patients diagnosed with breast 
cancer points to the need for expanded genetic testing in underserved 
communities. Researchers found that, compared with Caucasian patients, 
African-American patients are diagnosed at a younger age and are more 
likely to develop aggressive subtypes of breast cancer. While genetic 
differences between these populations play some role, just as important are 
other risk factors facing the African-American community, including 
inferior access to health care. This study points to the importance of 
personalized risk assessment in reducing deaths from aggressive breast 
cancers for African-American women.183  
In order to increase access to genetic testing, in 2009 the Cancer 
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Resource Foundation, a 501(c)(3) organization led by oncology and public 
health nurses, implemented the Genetic Information for Treatment 
Screening and Surveillance (“GIFTSS”) program in Massachusetts. The 
purpose of GIFTSS was to support low-income, underinsured people who 
could not afford the out-of-pocket expenses associated with genetic 
testing.  Referring physicians were clinical genetic counselors, OB/GYN 
providers, and medical oncologists.184 A study of the results of this testing 
discovered that, when financial barriers were removed, the population 
studied faced comparable rates of positive genetic testing results as 
reported in the literature, which generally studies well-insured, Caucasian 
populations.185 
While this increased access to genetic testing clearly afforded benefits 
to the individuals tested, it should be noted that the voucher program 
created advantages for the health care system and the research community 
as well. As noted by the authors of a study about the GIFTSS program, 
“[f]or those individuals . . . who did not have a familial mutation, the 
emotional and financial benefit of learning of these negative results and 
not needing additional medical intervention may be beneficial at both the 
individual and the larger economic level.”186 Moreover, at-risk individuals 
may avail themselves of treatment, diagnostic, or prevention 
recommendations, though the study’s authors noted that future research 
was necessary in order to determine if access to genetic testing truly 
improves outcomes for this population.187 Finally, enhanced access to 
genetic testing in underserved populations affords researchers the 
opportunity to approach community members, and, after obtaining 
informed consent for research participation, access data that will provide 
better information about the health needs of this community. The 
reluctance of certain low-income and/or minority communities to 
contribute to genetic research, in light of the medical atrocities they have 
suffered, is well documented, and contributes to a paucity of information 
about the health needs of these underserved populations.188 The 
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opportunity to receive genetic risk information in return for participation 
may foster trust and engagement in medical research on the part of these 
low-income and minority communities.  
There is some bipartisan support in Congress for lowering barriers to 
the use of genetic testing. In February 2018, a bipartisan group of 
Congressional representatives introduced legislation, called the Advancing 
Access to Precision Medicine Act,189 that would direct the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services to work with the National 
Academy of Medicine “to study how genetic and genomic testing might 
improve preventative care and precision medicine and reduce health 
disparities.”190 Those agencies would also study the possibility of 
expanding health insurance coverage to cover genetic testing and 
counseling.191 This bill is still in the first stage of the legislative process, 
and will be considered by a committee before potentially being sent on to 
the House or Senate.192 While passage is unlikely, especially in the current 
political climate,193 it is important to note that bipartisan support 
nonetheless remains for such an investment in predictive medicine. 
Ultimately, the decline in the cost of genomic sequencing and the 
growth of the genetic testing market will make such testing widely 
available. Market research demonstrates that the genetic testing market 
continues to grow, notwithstanding the fact that even those who are 
insured face reimbursement challenges. There are currently more than 
74,000 commercially available genetic tests in the United States and 
fourteen new tests entering the market daily.194 In 2015, two large 
commercial payors, UnitedHealthcare and Anthem, instituted a process of 
automated prior authorization for all genetic testing and many other payors 
have indicated that they will follow suit. The categories of prenatal, 
hereditary cancer, and oncology treatment accounted for 90% of 
commercial payor spending.195 
The direct-to-consumer (DTC) testing market is also providing genetic 
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risk information to those who seek it out. In April 2017, the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) allowed marketing of 23andMe Personal 
Genome Service Genetic Health Risk (“GHR”) tests for ten diseases or 
conditions, which represent the first DTC tests authorized by the FDA that 
provide information about a person’s genetic risk factors.196 The company 
charges $199 for the test, which assesses, through a saliva sample, several 
genetic risk factors, including selected BRCA1 and BRCA2 variants.197  
The company does not provide any genetic counseling service. Instead, 
23andMe refers concerned clients to professional organizations that can 
assist them in locating a genetic counselor.198 This is similar to the 
deCODE website, in that individuals are proactively seeking out their 
genetic risk factors, albeit with a fee in the case of 23andMe.  
IX. CONCLUSION 
As the cost of genomic sequencing drops and consumers become more 
accustomed to accessing genetic risk information for themselves, whether 
through direct-to-consumer businesses like 23andMe or other means, 
public support will grow for making use of such data. This is what 
Stefánsson is counting on when he notes that deCODE’s new website 
service is “automatically building pressure on health authorities” to 
approach individuals about their health risks. While it can indeed prove 
life-saving to be informed of one’s genetic risk factors, the law should stop 
short of supplying such information to individuals without their explicit 
consent, especially when the data has been imputed. There are many valid 
reasons, including socio-emotional factors and the desire to avoid 
discrimination in health insurance, that cause people to decline this 
information, and each person reserves the right to make his or her own 
health care decisions, whether he or she is foolish or sensible. It is clear, 
when viewing the results in Iceland, where the information is offered free 
of charge but only a small percentage of citizens access it, that there is still 
resistance to receiving information about one’s genetic risk factors. The 
optimal way to make use of this information is to increase affordable 
access to genetic data and counseling, and also invest in robust public 
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service media campaigns that explain the importance of accessing one’s 
genetic profile. Any changes in norms with respect to the right not to 
know must come from the citizens themselves, not from the top down, and 
the role of the government and medical professionals is to encourage 
citizens to access and make informed choices about their receipt of 
essential genomic health data. 
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